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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes George J. Stigler’s influential contributions to economic ideas, specifically on 
industrial structures, the functioning of markets, the causes and effects of public regulation, the 
economics of information, and on the development of economic thought. Stigler’s most influential 
contribution to economic thought came in his work on information theory. Treating information as a 
valuable commodity, he explained why prices differ for identical goods. From his work, many other 
theories have been built to explain economic behavior. A considerable number of works on decision 
making under uncertainty could not have progressed without an understanding of the role of 
information. His swing of the pendulum in economic regulation constitutes a great turnabout. He 
started research, known as public choice, which assumes that government policy makers are driven by 
self-interest rather than pure concern for the public’s welfare. His views have now become those of  
the mainstream.  
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INTRODUCTION 
George Joseph Stigler won the Nobel Prize in 
Economic Sciences in 1982 for his seminal 
studies of industrial structures, the functioning of 
markets, and the causes and effects of public 
regulation. The objective of this paper is to 
describe Stigler’s influential contributions to 
economic thought. This paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 will discuss Stigler’s work on 
industrial structures. Section 3 will explore 
Stigler’s contributions to the functioning of 
markets. Section 4 will discuss his swing of the 
pendulum on the causes and effects of public 
regulation, which is considered as a great 
turnabout. Section 5 will present his other path-
breaking ideas on the economics of information 
and the development of economic thought, and 
Section 6 will conclude the paper. 
Stigler was born in Seattle, Washington in 
1911. He attended various schools in Seattle and 
went to the University of Washington, where he 
earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1931. He got 
his graduate degree from the University of 
Chicago in 1938. He began teaching in 1936. In 
1938, he went to the University of Minnesota, 
from which he took a leave of absence for 
several years during the war, as a member of the 
Statistical Research Group at Columbia 
University. After the war, he returned to 
Minnesota, and then moved to Brown 
University. He taught at Columbia University 
from 1947 to 1958. In 1958, he accepted an offer 
from the University of Chicago, where he stayed 
until his death in 1991. Stigler’s PhD disser-
tation was a historical survey of neoclassical 
theories. The dissertation was published as 
Production and Distribution Theories (1941). In 
the 1940s, he began empirical work on the price 
theory, starting with a test of the kinked 
oligopoly demand curve theory of rigid prices. 
In 1946, he published an early work on linear 
programming, The Cost of Subsistence. In the 
1950s, he proposed the survivor method of 
determining the most efficient size for enter-
prises, and worked on delivered price systems 
and vertical integration, among others. Even 
prior to his Chicago academic life, he was 
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interested in the existence of the dispersion of 
prices under conditions which economic theory 
said would yield a single price. That interest 
culminated in his article The Economics of 
Information (1961). A steady flow of perceptive 
and thoughtful articles were collected in Essays 
in the History of Economics (1965). He always 
maintained his interest in the history of 
economics. His autobiography, Memoirs of an 
Unregulated Economist (1985), challenges and 
induces his non-economist readers to think as 
economists do about a variety of problems 
involving decisions based on limited resources, 
and provides his economist readers with an 
insider’s view of the development of economic 
thought from the beginning of his career through 
his association with the Chicago School. 
Friedman’s opinion on Stigler’s memoirs is that 
they represent his own engaging personality and 
his extraordinarily various contributions to 
economics (Friedman, 1999; Stigler, 1982b).   
ON INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURES 
Stigler’s main contribution to the field of 
industrial organization, both in the book The 
Organization of Industry (1968) and in articles 
after the publication of the book, was the use of 
empirical evidence to test hypotheses designed 
to explain features of industrial organization. 
Industrial economists in that era focused their 
research on theoretical work. His articles 
combined subtle theoretical analysis with 
substantial empirical evidence. These articles 
illustrated the swing in Stigler’s views on 
antitrust: From being a proponent of antitrust 
policies to skepticism about even a minimalist 
policy (Friedman, 1999). 
Stigler stated that the purely economic 
argument against monopoly is very different 
from what non-economists might expect. 
Successful monopolists earn extra-large profits 
by raising prices above what they would be with 
competition, so that customers pay extra and the 
monopolists gain. However, economists see no 
reason to criticize monopolies simply because 
they transfer any surplus from customers to the 
monopolists, since economists have no way of 
knowing who is the more worthy—producer or 
consumer. The purely economic case against 
monopoly is that it reduces aggregate economic 
welfare. When the monopolist raises prices 
above the competitive level, in order to reap the 
monopoly profits, customers buy less of the 
product, so less is produced, and society as a 
whole is worse-off. A monopoly creates dead-
weight losses. Diverting from his initial position 
on antitrust policies, Stigler lost his enthusiasm 
for them. He argued that several kinds of 
evidence suggested that monopolies and small-
number oligopolies have limited powers to earn 
much more than competitive rates of return on 
capital. A large number of studies have 
compared the rate of return on investment with 
the degree to which industries are concentrated. 
Less than 25 percent of the variations in profit 
rates across industries were contributed by 
concentration (Stigler, www.econlib.org/ 
library/Enc/Monopoly.html, accessed July 22, 
2003).  
In The Economists and the Problem of 
Monopoly (1982), Stigler reviews the attitudes of 
economists toward monopolies as being a 
problem with public policy from the era of 
Smith, Ricardo, Mill, and Marshall, to the 
Sherman Act. He concludes his survey by stating 
that the attitude of economists toward a 
monopoly policy is strongly influenced by the 
technical price theory (Stigler, 1982: 9). Stigler’s 
article, Notes on the Theory of Duopoly (1940) 
reappraises certain theories on duopoly which 
have already been advanced: 
“The very magnitude of the literature on the 
theory of duopoly may be interpreted as 
indirect evidence of the unsatisfactory state 
of this theory. Duopoly seems to present one 
of those problems concerning which, every-
thing sensible that can be said doubtless 
already has been said, and yet no single 
solution commands general agreement” 
(Stigler, 1940: 521). 
The theory of duopoly may be summarized 
when the products are homogeneous and their 
price and output are the only variables of the 
policy. The usual solution will be an agreement 
on price, although not necessarily at the 
monopoly level, and each duopoly will form 
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anticipations with respect to their rival’s 
behavior. Stigler extended the theory of duopoly 
by including variables of market policy other 
than price and output, i.e. product differen-
tiation, advertising, research and development, 
and product variation (Stigler, 1940: 533-539). 
With differentiated products, the possibility of 
price competition becomes slightly more 
realistic, since a duopoly may believe that its 
price cuts will be ignored, or at most only 
partially matched by the rival and perhaps only 
after a time lag. There is no longer any necessity 
for price uniformity. In the presence of 
uncertainty, duopolists will engage in many 
forms of rivalry. Such rivalries have frequently 
been pointed out in advertising, and the evidence 
is also clear from research into product improve-
ments, cost reductions, and the expansion of 
investment. In the case of a product variation, if 
the variation of the product is profitable, it will 
be a continuous characteristic of the market. The 
n-dimensional nature of commodities will 
increase the number of duopoly relationships, 
i.e. even if there are many firms making a 
commodity, usually only relatively few of these 
firms will be emphasizing the same qualities of 
product and appealing to the same consumer 
groups (Stigler, 1940: 541).  
Stigler’s article titled, A Theory of Oligopoly 
(1964), accepts the hypothesis that oligopolists 
wish to collude to maximize joint profits. 
However, his paper seeks to reconcile this wish 
with facts, such as that collusion is impossible 
for many firms, and collusion is much more 
effective in some circumstances than in others. 
His empirical evidence shows that the more 
concentrated the industry structure is, the larger 
are the price reductions. There are various bits of 
evidence which are fairly favorable to the theory, 
but they do not constitute strong support (Stigler, 
1964: 44). He concluded by stating: 
“More powerful tests will be feasible when 
the electrical equipment triple-damage suits 
are tried. The great merit of our theory, in 
fact, is that it has numerous testable 
hypotheses, unlike the immortal theories that 
have been traditional in this area (Stigler, 
1964: 59). 
The fundamental proposition in the industrial 
prices literature is that prices in industrial 
markets, especially those which are oligopolistic 
in structure, are unresponsive to changes in 
general business conditions, and this behavior is 
pervasive. Stigler co-authored an important 
empirical study of prices with Kindahl, The 
Behavior of Industrial Prices (1970), which 
examines the question of price stability and 
presents meticulous data. The book’s statistical 
evidence helps undermine the long-standing 
economic maxim that a major segment of the 
economy sets prices by management decision, 
rather than in reaction to market factors. 
Stigler’s article (co-authored with Kindahl), 
Industrial Prices, as Administered by Dr. Means 
(1973) aimed at examining the evidence on the 
view that industrial prices are rigid to change. 
Means (1972) has reinterpreted the evidence on 
pricing behavior presented in Stigler’s and 
Kindahl’s book. Further, Stigler wrote that 
Means is duly rewarded for his diligence by 
finding that the administered-price thesis is fully 
confirmed (Stigler and Kindahl, 1973: 717).  
Means’ initial interpretation of an 
administered price is a price which is set by 
administrative action and held constant for a 
period of time.  Means’ new reinterpretation was 
that administered prices should be corrected for 
trends, and that the administered price thesis is 
not concerned with regular seasonal price jumps. 
The administered price thesis holds that a large 
body of industrial prices do not behave in the 
fashion that classical theory would lead one to 
expect. Stigler stated that Means’ theory has 
become difficult to refute or confirm, due to the 
absence of a well-defined set of criteria, which 
means no test can be convincing.  The thesis that 
modern economics has received from Means is 
that perverse or unresponsive price behavior is 
widespread. Stigler’s and Kindahl’s study 
contradicts that thesis (Stigler and Kindahl, 
1973: 717-718; 721). Now, Stigler’s view on this 
matter has become the mainstream view. 
ON FUNCTIONING OF MARKETS 
Stigler’s significant contribution to modern ways 
of thinking about economics lay in the intellec-
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tual development of the production theory in his 
book Production and Distribution Theories, the 
Formative Period (1941) .and his subsequent 
article on the development of the utility theory 
(1950). They were very influential in forming 
modern economics’ consensus on topics that are 
central to the discipline, and remain as the 
standard references (Rosen, 1993: 812).   
Stigler’s first important publication after his 
dissertation was a textbook, The Theory of 
Competitive Price (1942) which was followed 
by revised version titled The Theory of Price 
(1946). His textbook was the first modern text 
about microeconomic theory, and it provided the 
style and organization for subsequent micro-
economic theory textbooks to mimick (Rosen, 
1993). In this book, he illustrated many 
principles of economics with real data, rather 
than hypothetical examples. Its systematic 
linking of a highly abstract theory to observable 
phenomena is unique among intermediate 
textbooks on price theory, as is its concise yet 
rigorous exposition. Stigler deserves credit for 
getting economists to look at data and evidence. 
His knowledge of where economics came from 
allowed him to contemplate large-scale problems 
in the natural course of things. However, he was 
interested in both large and small problems 
(Friedman, 1999; Rosen, 1993: 812). In his 
paper Production and Distribution in the Short 
Run (1939), Stigler argued how a more flexible 
organization of production would better 
accommodate variations in output, and why this 
refinement of the standard model was needed to 
account for the empirical time series insen-
sitivity of average production costs. The idea is 
an important generalization of the Marshallian 
distinction between the short run and long run, 
and a clear precursor to the modern literature on 
the adjustment of quasi fixed factors over 
business cycles (Rosen, 1993: 812-813). 
A famous theorem in economics states that a 
competitive enterprise economy will produce the 
largest possible income from a given stock of 
resources. No real economy meets the exact 
conditions of the theorem, and all real 
economies will fall short of the ideal economy. 
The divergence of the real economies from the 
ideal ones is called market failure. In Stigler’s 
view, however, the degree of market failure for 
the US economy is much smaller than the 
political failure caused by the imperfections in 
economic policies found in real political 
systems. The merits of laissez faire rest less 
upon its famous theoretical foundations than 
upon its advantages over the actual performance 
of rival forms of economic organization (Stigler 
in www.econlib.org/librari/Enc/Monopoly.html).  
In Smith’s Travels on the Ship of State 
(1971), Stigler argued that Smith gave self-
interest pride of place in analyzing the economic 
market, but he did not give it the same role in 
analyzing the political market. Smith’s failure to 
do so constitutes Stigler’s main and only 
criticism of the Wealth of Nations, that 
“stupendous palace erected upon the granite of 
self-interest” (Friedman, 1999). Stigler mention-
ed that his work on search and information 
stemmed from the classical debates on the limits 
of defining markets in terms of price uniformity. 
The hints for the following question, “How 
much price dispersion could a single market 
sustain?” are in the article that tracked the late 
development of the concept of perfect compe-
tition titled, Perfect Competition, Historically 
Contemplated (1957). Stigler’s fundamental 
thesis is that hardly any important improvement 
in general economic theory can fail to affect the 
concept of competition. He argued that the 
concept has proved to be a tough and resilient 
concept and it will stay within the existing 
literature on economics for a long time (Stigler, 
1957: 17). 
ON CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF PUBLIC 
REGULATION:  A GREAT TURNABOUT  
The absence of quantitative studies of the actual 
effect of regulation challenged Stigler. In 1962 
he wrote articles with Claire Friedland on the 
regulation of the prices of public utilities, What 
Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of 
Electricity. The article concluded that the 
regulation of electric utilities had produced no 
significant effect on the rates they charged. This 
was followed two years later by Public 
Regulation of the Securities Market (1964). The 
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article investigated the adequacy of the controls 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
exercise over the security markets. This article 
concluded that purchasers of new stock issues 
fared no better or worse after the creation of the 
SEC than before (Friedman, 1999, and Stigler 
(1964: 117-142).  In the Theory of Economic 
Regulation (1971), Stigler answered the question 
of “If regulation does not generally achieve its 
stated objectives, why have so many agencies 
been established and kept in existence?” 
Stigler’s answer was “As a rule, regulation is 
acquired by the industry and is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit”. Further, 
Stigler argued that two alternative views of the 
regulation industry were held: (i) Regulation is 
instituted primarily for the protection and benefit 
of the public at large, or some large subdivision 
of the public, (ii) the political process defies 
rational explanation. His thesis has become the 
orthodox view in the profession: The idealistic 
view of public regulation is deeply imbedded in 
professional economic thought. The fundamental 
vice of such a view is that it misdirects attention 
–to preaching to the regulators rather than 
changing their incentives. His analysis fed the 
field of public choice by shifting it from viewing 
the political market as not being susceptible to 
economic analysis - one in which disinterested 
politicians and bureaucrats pursue the public 
interest - to viewing it as one in which the 
participants are seeking, as in the economic 
market, to pursue their own interests, and hence 
are subject to analysis with the usual tools of 
economics (Friedman, 1999). Stigler argued that 
governments do not end up creating monopolies 
in industries by accident. Rather, they regulate at 
the command of producers who capture the 
regulatory agency and use regulation to prevent 
competition. Probably of more importance than 
the evidence itself was the fact that Stigler made 
this viewpoint respectable in the economics 
profession. It has now become the mainstream 
view.  
Stigler shifted his views on antitrust laws. He 
was a proponent of antitrust laws in the 1940s 
and 1950s. He was influenced by his colleague 
and friend, Henry Simon from the University of 
Chicago. Following Simon, who proposed the 
nationalization of uncompetitive industries such 
as railroads and utilities, Stigler proposed the 
fragmentation of concentrated big businesses 
and punishments for companies engaged in 
collusion. He provided testimony in Congress in 
1950 and advocated that the US Steel 
Corporation be broken up. By the early 1970s, 
Stigler had shifted his view and was influenced 
by the work of Aaron Director and Joseph 
Schumpeter and a new theory of oligopoly. He 
concluded that concentration did not necessarily 
cause a monopolistic pricing. Stigler opposed 
most antirust legislation. He had admitted his 
mistakes and changed his views. It takes courage 
and honesty to go against one’s vested interests, 
especially after publishing books and articles on 
his previous way of thinking about antitrust 
laws. It is an admirable thing from an academia 
who was willing to alter his view when he was 
convinced by the facts or a new theory. 
Therefore, Stigler’s change of view can be 
regarded as one of great turnabouts in economic 
thought 
(www.libertyhaven.com/theoreticalorphilosophi
cal issues/austrianeconomics, accessed July 22, 
2003). 
In his Nobel Memorial Lecture, Stigler 
stated that there is an interesting asymmetry in 
the success of the literature on economic 
regulation, when it deals with the two problems 
into which the theory is commonly divided: (i) 
Why are regulatory policies adopted and 
abandoned? (ii) What are the effects of 
regulation? Economists have been much more 
successful in measuring the effects of policies 
than in explaining their implementation, since 
one can choose the effects of a policy to study, 
and usually the more easily measured effects are 
selected for examination. Studies of the effects 
of regulatory policies have usually been 
concerned with their effect upon prices and 
outputs, although the effects desired by the 
proponents of these policies have probably been 
upon income distribution. Specifically, he wrote: 
“The panoply of regulatory measures can be 
used to affect vast income redistributions, 
and these redistributions of income do not 
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appear explicitly in the budget of the state. 
The frequent exclusion of new entrants from 
a field, for example, leads to smaller outputs, 
higher prices, and higher profits for the 
protected enterprises, and allows these 
benefits to increase with the growth of the 
protected are. If these income transfers are as 
large as fragmentary evidence suggests, the 
theory of regulation may well become a full 
partner of tax and expenditure theory in 
public finance” (Stigler, 1982: 68). 
In addition, Stigler’s focus on statistical 
documentation has been revolutionary. Much of 
the credit for the growing interest in the 
empirical verification of economic theory 
therefore must be given to Stigler (Current 
Contents, 1984). 
STIGLER’S PATH BREAKING 
CONTRIBUTION 
1. On Economics of Information 
The Economics of Information (1961) gave birth 
to an essentially new area of study for econo-
mists. Stigler termed it as his most important 
contribution to economic theory. In his article, 
he stated: 
“One should hardly have to tell academicians 
that information is a valuable resource: 
Knowledge is power. And yet it occupies a 
slum dwelling in the town of economics. 
Mostly it is ignored: The best technology is 
assumed to be known; the relationship of 
commodities to consumer preferences is a 
datum. And one of the information-
producing industries, advertising, is treated 
with a hostility that economists normally 
reserve for tariffs or monopolists.  ...our 
understanding of economic life will be 
incomplete if we do not systematically take 
account of the cold winds of ignorance” 
(Stigler, 1961: 213-224). 
This article was one of his most cited 
articles, i.e. 57 citations in 2006 (Diamond, 
2006). It discusses the costs and benefits to 
producers and consumers of supplying and 
obtaining information about commodities. In his 
A Theory of Oligopoly (1964), Stigler was the 
first economist to show how information’s 
acquisition and its statistical inferences would be 
rationally used by economic agents and would 
affect their actions. In the article, Stigler 
introduced aspects of the statistical decision 
theory into applied economics, and showed by 
important examples how those ideas could be 
used in practical cases (Rosen, 1993: 813; 
Current Contents, 1984). In the article, Stigler 
stated: 
“The present paper accepts the hypothesis 
that oligopolists wish to collude to maximize 
joint profits. It seeks to reconcile this wish 
with facts, such as that collusion is 
impossible for many firms and collusion is 
much more effective in some circumstances 
than in others. The reconciliation is found in 
the problem of policing a collusive 
agreement, which proves to be a problem in 
the theory of information (Stigler, 1964, 
p.44). 
In his Nobel Memorial Lecture, Stigler 
stated that economists have always known that 
the extent and accuracy of the knowledge of the 
economic actor had influence, and often a 
decisive influence, on his behavior and therefore 
on the behavior of markets (Stigler, 1982: 65). In 
his 1961 article, he proposed the use of the 
standard economic theory of utility-maximizing 
behavior to determine how much information 
people would acquire with special attention to 
the prices at which they would buy and sell, and 
a year later he made an application of the 
analysis to labor markets. He was happy to 
witness the emergence of the Economics of 
Information: 
“The proposal to study the economics of 
information was promptly and widely 
accepted, and without even a respectable 
minimum of controversy. Within a decade 
and a half, the literature had become so 
extensive and the theorists working in the 
field so prominent, that the subject was given 
a separate classification in the Index of 
Economic Articles, and more than a hundred 
articles a year are now devoted to this 
subject” (Stigler, 1982: 66). 
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Stigler’s article titled, “Information in the 
Labor Market” (1962), argued that job seekers 
needed short periods of unemployment in order 
to seek higher wages. Stigler’s argument is now 
called the theory of search unemployment 
(www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Stigler.html, 
accessed July 22, 2003). Even in industries with 
a constant prevailing wage, variances in wage 
rates still exist. Hence, the unemployed are as 
much information seekers as job seekers: 
“No worker, unless his degree of 
specialization is pathological, will ever be 
able to become informed on the prospective 
earnings which would be obtained from 
every one of these potential employers at any 
given time, let alone keep this information 
up to date. He faces the problem of how to 
acquire information on the wage rates, 
stability of employment, conditions of 
employment, and other determinants of job 
choice, and how to keep this information 
current” (Stigler, 1962: 94).  
2. On Development of Economic Thought 
Stigler is also highly regarded as an economic 
historian. He wrote numerous articles on the 
history of ideas. He has assembled an 
extraordinary library of the classics. His interests 
in, and commitment to, the history of thought 
had personal consumption and investment 
aspects which creates benefits for the economics 
community. Stigler invested heavily in the 
classics since he found them fertile grounds for 
gaining deep economic understanding and 
insight. Stigler added important, original, and 
thoroughly modern ideas to the classics when he 
took inspiration from them. He added empirical 
orientation and commitment to quantitative 
evidence which were not derived from earlier 
economists (Rosen, 1993: 810-812). 
Stigler’s article, The Development of Utility 
Theory (1950) was written with the aim of 
simply setting forth the major steps in the 
development of a branch of economic theory, 
hoping that it can be justified by its contribution 
to the understanding of modern economics, and 
also to answer the question, “Why do 
economists change their theories?” The article 
covers the period from Smith (1776), Bentham 
(1789), Dumont (1802), Ricardo, Dupuit (1844), 
Gossen (1854), Jevons, Menger, and Walras 
(1870s), Marshall, to Slutsky (1915). There is a 
sluggishness in the way the utility theory 
progressed. The additive utility function was 
popularized in the 1870s and it was 1909 before 
the implication of positively sloping income 
curves was derived. The generalized utility 
function was proposed in 1881 and in 1915 the 
implications were derived. The chief of these 
implications is that if consumers do not buy less 
of a commodity when their incomes rise, they 
will surely buy less when the price of the 
commodity rises. This was the chief product. 
These very able economists had known all along 
that demand curves have negative slopes, quite 
independently of their utility theorizing. Stigler 
stated that the above mentioned economists 
improved economics substantially: 
“Had specific tests have been made of the 
implications of theories, the unfruitfulness of 
the ruling utility theory as a source of 
hypotheses in demand would soon have 
become apparent. Had these economists 
sought to establish true economic theories of 
economic behavior –that is, to isolate 
uniformities of economic events that 
permitted prediction of the effects of given 
conditions –they would not long have been 
content with the knowledge that demand 
curves have negative slopes…. That such 
able economists were delayed and distracted 
by the lack of a criterion of refutable 
implications of theories would be a finding 
as useful to us as any of the fine theoretical 
advances they made” (Stigler, 1950: 396).  
Stigler helped keep alive one of Smith’s 
great unworked themes in his article title, “The 
Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the 
Market” (1951). In describing the evolution of 
industry, he argued that increasing return 
activities would be vertically integrated within 
firms when an industry was young and newly 
developed. As the industry grew and demand 
increased sufficiently, they would be spun off 
into independent units. This picture of vertical 
disintegration with progress better describes 
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changes in the organization of knowledge over 
time, than in many material goods industries 
(Rosen, 1993: 813-814). 
Stigler analyzed the work of Smith in The 
Successes and Failures of Professor Smith 
(1976). He argued that Smith had one 
overwhelming and proper success—the theorem 
on resource allocation under competition—and 
several minor successes. He further argued that 
Smith’s most important analytical failure was 
the hierarchy of employments of capital. Smith’s 
hierarchy of employments of capital never had a 
prospect of scientific prosperity due to logical 
error (Stigler, 1976:1199-1211). Stigler 
appraised Smith as successful in providing a 
theorem of almost unlimited power on the 
behavior of man. In Stigler’s words, Smith’s 
construct of the self-interest-seeking individual 
in a competitive environment is Newtonian in its 
universality (Stigler, 1976: 1212).   
Stigler wrote several articles on Ricardo. In 
Sraffa’s Ricardo (1953), he argued that Ricardo 
was a fortunate man, who lived in a period when 
an untutored genius could still remake economic 
science, and lived in a nation where two great 
problems, i.e. inflation and free trade, gave 
direction and significance to economics. He 
argued that Ricardo’s policy recommendations 
were profoundly good but his theory was not of 
the highest quality (Stigler, 1953: 686).  In 
Ricardo and the 93% Labor Theory of Value 
(1958), Stigler seeks to set forth precisely what 
Ricardo’s theory of value was, and to examine 
the interpretation placed upon it by his leading 
contemporaries. He concluded that Ricardo’s 
theory is relatively more misunderstood today 
than it was in his lifetime, and that one can build 
a strong case that the modern economist need 
not be acquainted with Ricardo’s work, but there 
is no case for his being acquainted with an 
imposer (Stigler, 1958: 358-367). In The 
Ricardian Theory of Value and Distribution 
(1952), Stigler stated that economics is the body 
of substantive generalizations on the workings of 
economic systems, and Ricardo did not enlarge 
this body of knowledge by much. Ricardo’s one 
addition to Smith’s work was the systematic, 
though only partial, recognition of diminishing 
returns. Ricardo had great powers of abstraction 
and synthesis. Population, natural resources, 
capital accumulation, and the distribution of 
income were woven into a sweeping theoretical 
system (Stigler, 1952: 206). Stigler compared 
the work of Smith and Ricardo: 
“Although Smith and Ricardo had cost 
theories of value, there were important 
differences in the basic principles: (i) Smith 
believed that population changes lagged 
behind changes in the quantity of capital; 
therefore, wages were indefinitely above the 
subsistence level in an advancing society, (ii) 
The tenor of Smith’s theory of rent, which 
was not given a coherent statement, was that 
aggregate rents are a residual but that the 
rent of any one use of land is a cost 
determined by the alternative uses of the 
land. Ricardo ignored the multiplicity of uses 
of land; (iii) Smith believed that the 
accumulation of capital led to a fall in the 
rate of profits, whereas Ricardo –arguing 
from Say’s law- denied that capital 
accumulation had any effect upon the rate of 
profits (unless the cost of food increased); 
(iv) Smith’s measure of value was designed 
to answer the same question as modern index 
numbers: How to eliminate differences in the 
value of money and thus ascertain the real 
changes. Ricardo’s measure, on the other 
hand, was not a price deflator. It was 
designed to locate the source of changes in 
value in order to connect wages and profits 
to labor’s and capital’s share in the national 
income minus rents. Modern economics is 
closer to Smith’s position than to Ricardo’s 
on each of these differences, although in the 
case of rent we use Ricardo’s techniques to 
analyze Smith’s problem. Ricardo had 
neither Smith’s genius for isolating 
fundamental empirical relationships, nor his 
supreme common sense. Yet, Ricardo was, 
in his own terrain of technical analysis, 
superior to Smith. Measured by the signi-
ficance of the variables and the managea-
bility of the system, he fashioned what is 
probably the most impressive of all models 
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in economic analysis” (Stigler, 1952: 204-
207). 
Stigler’s many contributions to economic 
theory were all a by-product of seeking to 
understand the real world, and nearly all led to 
an attempt to provide some quantitative evidence 
to test the theory, or to provide empirical 
counterparts to theoretical concepts (Friedman, 
1999). De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum 
(1977)–translated roughly as There Is No 
Accounting for Taste which was written together 
with Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize winner in 
Economics in 1992, is probably the best example 
of Stigler’s combination of theory and 
confirmation by observational data. In that 
article, it is stated that according to the belief 
among traditional economists, certain economic 
phenomena stem from personal taste and are 
therefore unsuitable for scientific analysis.  
However, in the paper, Stigler rejects the 
traditional view and proposes that standard 
economic logic and analysis be applied as 
extensively as possible. He asserts that it is not 
tastes that change, but levels of economic 
information. Stigler’s conclusions yield useful 
predictions about behavior (Stigler and Becker, 
1977: 76-90). In his Nobel Memorial Lecture in 
1982, The Process and Progress of Economics, 
Stigler mentioned again the idea of this article, 
by writing that Gary Becker has suggested that a 
substantial resistance to the acceptance of new 
ideas by scientists can be explained by the 
concept of specific human capital and the 
concept of risk aversion. The concept of specific 
human capital suggests that an established 
scholar possesses a valuable capital asset in his 
command of a particular body of knowledge, 
and that capital would be reduced if his 
knowledge were made obsolete by the general 
acceptance of a new theory. The risk aversion 
concept leads young scholars to prefer mastery 
of the established theories, rather than seeking 
radically different theories (Stigler, 1982a: 65; 
Stigler, 1982b). Stigler also presented the history 
of economics in his Nobel Memorial Lecture. He 
began by distinguishing the pre-scientific stage, 
i.e. the mercantilism, from its scientific stage. 
The mercantilism is characterized by the 
incompleteness of the body of knowledge, and 
by the absence of a set of interacting practi-
tioners who are devoting a large part of their 
lives to the accumulation of knowledge. Then he 
distinguished the economic science as the 
environmental view. The environmental view 
presents a systematic history of economic 
thought in terms of the responses of each 
generation to its environment. The respon-
siveness of economics to environmental 
problems will be more complete and more 
prompt, the more urgent the problems of the day 
are (Stigler, 1982a: 57-61; Stigler, 1982b).  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Stigler’s tangible work on industrial structures, 
the functioning of markets and the causes and 
effects of public regulation gained him the Nobel 
Prize in Economics. Yet, his intangible contri-
butions to economics were also as important. He 
has increased the standards of industrial 
economics far beyond the earlier periods. He has 
also made valuable contributions to the history 
and sociology of economic thought.  
Stigler’s most influential contribution to 
economic thought was his work on information 
theory. Reconciling the theory with the facts, 
Stigler investigated the importance of infor-
mation. He explained why prices differ for 
identical goods. From his work, many other 
theories are built to explain economic behavior. 
Studies on decision making under uncertainty 
would not have not have progressed without an 
understanding of the role of information, as put 
by Stigler.  
Stigler’s journey to the development of 
economic thought goes beyond the traditional 
issues of monopoly, regulation, and information. 
His swing of the pendulum in economic 
regulation constitutes a great turnabout. He was 
also the one who started the public choice study, 
which assumes that government’s policy making 
is driven by self-interest rather than a pure 
concern for the public’s welfare. His view has 
become the mainstream. Stigler’s vision on 
economic thought was path-breaking, serving 
economic literature extraordinarily well.  
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